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    Pages 5-42
  • Abstract || PDF
    •    º» ¿¬±¸´Â ¿À·§µ¿¾È À̿롤Àû¿ëÇØ ¿À´ø ¼ÒµæºÐ¹è¿¡ ´ëÇÑ °¡Ä¡±âÁØ, ¼ÒµæºÐÆ÷ÀÇ ºÒÆòµîµµ º¯µ¿ÀÌ·Ð, ºÒÆòµîÀÇ Ã´µµ ±×¸®°í Çѱ¹ÀÇ ºÒÆòµî¿¡ ´ëÇÏ¿© Àç°ËÅäÇÏ°íÀÚ ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ¿ì¼±, °ú°Å °ø¸®ÁÖÀÇÀÇ °¡Ä¡¿¡¼­ ·Î¿ïÁî Á¤ÀÇ·ÐÀ¸·Î, ºÒÆòµîÀÇ º¯µ¿¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÄíÁî³ÚÃ÷ À̷п¡¼­ °æÁ¦ÇÐÀû ¿øÀÎ ºÐ¼®¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Àç°ËÅä, ºÒÆòµî¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ±â¼úÀû ôµµ¿¡¼­ ±Ô¹üÀû ôµµ·Î ±×¸®°í Çѱ¹ÀÇ ºÒÆòµî º¯µ¿ ¾ç»ó°ú °èÃø¿¡ °üÇÑ ÀڷḦ ºÐ¼®¡¤°ËÅäÇÏ°í ±× °á°ú¿¡ µû¶ó ¸î °¡Áö Á¦¾ðÀ» ÇÏ°íÀÚ ÇÑ´Ù.
    Some Remarks on Regional Distributions of Income and Wealth in Korea
    Suk Bum Yoon
    Pages 43-52
  • Abstract || PDF
    •    The per capita regional income and wealth distributions in Korea are highly equal over time. and the shifts in ranking of both per capita Income and wealth levels are extensive, even though the differences are minimal. A production function estimated from regional cross-section statistics shows a rigid elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in Korea.
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    Pages 53-85
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    •    Á¦µµ¸¦ ÁÖ¾îÁø ¿©°ÇÀ¸·Î °£ÁÖÇÏ°í, °¡°Ý±â±¸¸¦ ÅëÇÑ °æÁ¦È°µ¿ÀÇ Á¶Á¤ ºû ¹èºÐÀû È¿À²¼ºÀ» °­Á¶ÇÏ´Â ÀúÅëÀûÀÎ ½Å°íÀüÇÐÆÄ¿Í °æÁ¦Çаú ´Þ¸® ÃÖ±Ù 20¿© ³â°£ Á¦µµ ¹× Á¦µµº¯È­¸¦ ³»»ýÀûÀ¸·Î ¼³¸íÇÏ·Á´Â Á¦µµ°æÁ¦ÇÐ ¿¬±¸°¡ È°¹ßÇÏ°Ô ÁøÇàµÇ¾ú´Ù. Á¦µµ¿¬±¸¶ó´Â °øÅëÀÇ °ü½É»ç¿¡µµ ºÒ±¸ÇÏ°í, ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ¿¬±¸°æ¾á ´ÜÀÏÇÑ ÂøÇ϶ó°í ÇÒ ¼ö ¾ø´Â, ´Ù¾çÇÑ ÀÌ·ÐÀû È帧À¸·Î ±¸¼ºµÇ¾î ÀÖ´Ù. º» ¿¬±¸´Â Á¦µµ°æÁ¦ÇÐÀÇ ÀϹÝÀûÀΠƯ¡À» »ìÆ캸°í, ´Ù¾çÇÑ Á¦µµ°æÁ¦ÇÐÀÇ ¿¬±¸Á¶·ùµéÀ» ºÐ¼® ´ë»ó, ¹æ¹ý·Ð ±×¸®°í Á¦µµÁøÈ­ÀÇ ¿ø¸®¸¦ Áß½ÉÀ¸·Î ºÐ·ù¡¤ºñ±³ÇÑ´Ù. ÀÌ´Â Á¦µµ°æÁ¦ÇÐÀÇ Á¦Á¶·ù°£ »óÈ£±³·ù¸¦ À§ÇÑ ÀüÁ¦ÀÛ¾÷À¸·Î¼­, ³ª¾Æ°¡ °æÁ¦ÇÐÀÇ ¹üÀ§ ¹× ºÐ¼®´É·ÂÀ» È®ÀåÇÏ´Â °è±â·Î¼­ÀÇ ÀÇÀǸ¦ °¡Áú ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù.
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    Pages 87-100
  • Abstract || PDF
    •    º» ³í¹®Àº ¾Ö·Î¿ìÀÇ ºÒ°¡´É¼º Á¤¸®¿¡ ÀûÀýÇÑ Á¦¾àÁ¶°ÇÀ» Çã¶ôÇÏ¿© »çȸ¹«Â÷º°ÇÔ¼ö°¡ Á¸ÀçÇÑ´Ù ÇÏ¿©µµ ¶Ç ÇϳªÀÇ ºÒ°¡´É¼ºÀÌ Á¸ÀçÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â °¡´É¼º¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ½ÇÇèÀû ¼Ò°íÀÌ´Ù. À¯·®º¯¼ö´Â ´ÜÀ§ ½Ã°£¿¡ ÃøÁ¤ÇÏ´Â Å©±âÀÌ´Ù. ´ëºÎºÐÀÇ °æÁ¦ºÐ¼®Àº ¿©±â¿¡ ±Ù°Å¸¦ µÎ°í ÀÖ´Ù. ¹Ý´ë·Î À¯·®º¯¼öÀÇ ¿ª¼ö´Â ´ÜÀ§ À¯·®º¯±¸ÀÇ È帧À» ÃøÁ¤ÇÏ´Â ½Ã°£ÀÌ´Ù. µû¶ó¼­, ¸ðµç °æÁ¦ºÐ¼®ÀÇ °á°ú´Â º¯¼öÀüȯ¿¡ ±Ù°Å¸¦ µÐ ºÐ¼®ÀÇ °á°ú¿Í ÀÏÄ¡ÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. ÀÌÁ¡¿¡ À־ ´Ü¼øÇÑ ºñ±³Á¤Åºм®Àº ½É°¢ÇÑ ¹®Á¦¸¦ ÀÏÀ¸Å°´Ù. ÀÌ°ÍÀÌ 2Â÷ ºÒ°¡´É¼ºÀÇ ±Ù¿øÀÌ µÉ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù.
    Fairness and Satisficing in Ultimatum Bargaining Game Experiments
    Youngse Kim
    Pages 101-119
  • Abstract || PDF
    •    We re-examine subjects' behavior in the ultimatum bargaining experiments studied by Roth et al. [24]. In our model, un-modeled factors including rationality determine players' initial aspirations, and a modified version of case-based learning process governs subsequent adaptations.
         The calibration results of this paper show that "satisficing" can explain the actual subjects' behavior surprisingly well. More precisely. it is shown that 77.7 to 96.7% of the observed behaviour is consistent with our model prediction. We also argue that the closer are the initial aspiration levels to the perfect equilibrium payoff, the lower is the mean or modal offer in the actual experiments.

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The Korean Journal of Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 2000)