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    Reputation in Market Participation Games
    Youngse Kim
    Pages 3-16
  • Abstract || PDF
    •    We examine reputation equilibria of what we call participation games, that have many economic examples, such as entry deterrence and product quality game. By perturbing the original game with types, we show that the lower bound of the single long run player's payoff is almost his Stackelberg commitment payoff in the limit as the finite horizon grows. Discontinuity exists between the infinite horizon and the limiting finite horizon problem. Our result is robust to a model modification in which the long run player announces the payoff structure before the whole game begins so that the rational type of long run player has to mimic not only the strategy of the Stackelberg commitment type but also the initial payoff announcement.
    Household Behavior: Allocation of Time Uses
    Chiho Kim
    Pages 17-29
  • Abstract || PDF
    •    This paper compares two static models for the time allocation of the husband and wife. The first model is an extension of the traditional work-leisure model to the household, and the second one is the household production model. The comparative static results reveal that the household production model uncover much more insightful implications for the time allocation decisions than the traditional work-leisure model. In addition, the efficiency parameters of the household production function play important roles in the household decisions.
    The Profitability of the Second Product Supplied by an Oligopolist
    Cheong-Seog Seo
    Pages 31-49
  • Abstract || PDF
    •    I investigate the possibility of product proliferation. It has been asserted that under horizontal differentiation whenever firms decide sequentially upon product specifications and prices, supplying a new product is unprofitable for the firm. This paper, however, shows that the results depends on the number of firms in the industry, the discount factor for future profits, and transportation cost. Specifically, in a circular model, when the transportation cost is quadratic in distance, producing more than one product is a subgame perfect equilibrium if there are more than three firms or more than two firms in the industry. However, the equilibrium profits with two products are lower than those with a single product. Thus, in a repeated game, supplying two products is not the only equilibrium. Trigger strategy also contributes an equilibrium if the discount factor is sufficiently large. However, as the number of firms in the industry increases, the possible gain in current profit by supplying another product becomes greater, so that, with a given discount factor, firms are more likely to supply two products. Consequently, for a given discount factor, there exist an n, such that, if the number of firms is greater than n, each firm will choose multiple products in equilibrium.
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    ±èÁø¿Á, ±èÁ¤½Ä
    Pages 51-66
  • Abstract || PDF
    •    º¯µ¿È¯À²Á¦µµÀÇ Ã¤Åà ÀÌÈÄ ½ÇÁúȯÀ²ÀÌ °úµµÇÏ°Ô º¯µ¿ÇÏÀÚ ½ÇÁúȯÀ²ÀÇ º¯µ¿¿äÀÎ Áß ¸í¸ñÃæ°ÝÀÇ Á߿伺 ¿©ºÎ´Â ÃÖ±Ù¿¡ À־ ¸¹Àº ³í¶õÀÌ µÇ°í ÀÖ´Ù. º» ³í¹®¿¡¼­´Â °ü¸®º¯µ¿È¯À² Á¦µµÇÏ¿¡¼­ Çѱ¹ÀÇ ´ë¹Ì, ´ëÀÏ ½ÇÁúȯÀ²ÀÇ º¯µ¿¿äÀÎÀ» ½Äº°ÇÏ¿´´Ù. ¸í¸ñȯÀ²°ú ½ÇÁúȯÀ²ÀÇ ´ÜÀ§±Ù °ËÁ¤°á°ú¿¡ ÀÇÇÏ¸é ´ë¹Ì, ´ëÀÏ ¸í¸ñȯÀ²°ú ½ÇÁúȯÀ²Àº ¸ðµÎ ºÒ¾ÈÁ¤ÇÑ ½Ã°è¿­ÀÓÀ» ¾Ë ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù. ¶ÇÇÑ Çѱ¹ ´ë ¹Ì±¹, Çѱ¹ ´ë ÀϺ»ÀÇ °¢ °æ¿ì¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ½ÇÁúȯÀ²°ú ¸í¸ñȯÀ²»çÀÌ¿¡ °øÀûºÐ°ËÁ¤°á°ú¿¡ µû¸£¸é ½ÇÁúȯÀ²ÀÇ º¯µ¿¿¡ À־ ¸í¸ñÃæ°Ý°ú ½ÇÁúÃæ°ÝÀÌ Á¸ÀçÇÏ°í ÀÖÀ½À» ¾Ë ¼ö ÀÖ¾ú´Ù. ±×¸®°í ±¸Á¶Àû VARÀÇ ÃßÁ¤°á°ú¿¡ ÀÇÇÏ¸é ´ë¹Ì½ÇÁúȯÀ²ÀÇ º¯µ¿¿¡ À־ Á¤ºÎÁöÃ⺯ȭ¿Í °°Àº ¼ö¿äÃæ°ÝÀÌ ¸Å¿ì Áß¿äÇÏ°í ¸í¸ñÃæ°ÝÀº ±× È¿°ú°¡ ¹Ì¹ÌÇÏ¿´´Ù. ´ëÀϽÇÁúȯÀ²ÀÇ º¯µ¿¿¡ ¼ö¿äÃæ°Ý ¸øÁö¾Ê°Ô °ø±ÞÃæ°Ýµµ Áß¿äÇÔÀ» ¾Ë ¼ö ÀÖ¾úÀ¸¸ç ¸í¸ñÃæ°ÝÀº ´Ü±â¿¡ À־´Â Áß¿äÇÏÁö¸¸ ½Ã°£ÀÌ È帧¿¡ µû¶ó ±× È¿°ú´Â ÇöÀúÈ÷ ¼Ò¸êµÊÀ» ¾Ë ¼ö ÀÖ¾ú´Ù.
    ÚÅÊàíÀÜâÀÇ ÞäüåÊàïÈíÀÜâ ÷áíÀÞÀåöóÑ樿¡ ´ëÇÑ æÚϼ -ÞäüåîÜ ùÜìÚëÒ Û°ÛöÀ» ñéãýÀ¸·Î-
    ¹ÚűÔ
    Pages 67-84
  • Abstract || PDF
    •    ¹Î°£ÀÚº»Àº »çȸ°£Á¢ÀÚº»È®ÃæÀ» À§ÇÑ °ø°øÅõÀÚ»ç¾÷¿¡ Âü¿©½ÃÅ°´Â ±âÁØÀ¸·Î¼­ »çȸÀû ÇÒÀÎÀ²À» Àû¿ëÇÏ´Â ¹æ¹ýÀ» Á¦¾ÈÇϱâ À§ÇØ ÀÌ·ÐÀûÀΠƲÀ» ´Ù·ç´Â °ÍÀ» ÁÖ¿äÇÑ ³»¿ëÀ¸·Î »ï°í ÀÖ´Ù. ÇöÀç Á¤ºÎ°¡ ¼öÇàÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Â ¸ðµç ÅõÀÚ»ç¾÷ÀÌ °ø°øÀç¿¡ °¡±î¿î ÀçÈ­ÀÇ °ø±Þ¿¡¼­ºÎÅÍ °æ¿ì¿¡ µû¶ó¼­´Â ¹Î°£Àç¿¡ °¡±î¿î ÀçÈ­¸¦ °ø±ÞÇϱâ À§ÇÑ ÅõÀÚ»ç¾÷ µî ¸Å¿ì ´Ù¾çÇÑ Æ¯¼º°ú ±¤¹üÀ§ÇÑ ÅõÀÚ»ç¾÷µéÀ» ±¸¼ºÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Ù. ´ÜÀÏÀÇ »çȸÀû ÇÒÀÎÀ² ´ë½Å Á¤ºÎÅõÀÚ»ç¾÷ÀÇ Æ¯¼ºÀ» °í·ÁÇÑ ´Ù´Ü°èÀÇ »çȸÀû ÇÒÀÎÀ²À» Àû¿ëÇÏ´Â °æ¿ì, °ø°ø¼ºÀÌ ³·°í ½ÃÀ强ÀÌ ³ôÀº ¹Î°£Àç¿¡ °¡±î¿î ÀçÈ­ÀÇ °ø±ÞÀ» À§ÇÑ ÅõÀÚ»ç¾÷ºÎÅÍ ¹Î°£ºÎ¹®¿¡ À̾çÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ÀÌ·ÐÀûÀÎ ±Ù°Å¸¦ Á¦°øÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ°Ô µÈ´Ù.
    Demographic Transition and Economic Development in Korea
    Sung Yeal Koo
    Pages 85-102
  • Abstract || PDF
    •    Decomposition of the demographic factors behind Korea's rapid demographic transition show, that decline in marital fertility reduced CBR by 0.7~0.6% point for each of the last three decades. Higher age at marriage explains additional 0.44% and 0.48% point of the decline in CBR during the 1960's and 1980's. The empirical hypotheses taken by the main stream economic theory of fertility seem to fit well the Korean transition. Family income over the last 30 years has been rising rapidly, while prices of other goods and services had become relatively cheaper. Both consumption for adults and child quality seem to have increased substantially while fertility declined very rapidly.
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    ÑÑÔÔéð
    Pages 103-130
  • Abstract || PDF
    •    º» ³í¹®Àº ÀÏÁ¦¸» Àü½ÃÅëÁ¦Ã¼Á¦°¡ ¾î¶°ÇÑ °æÁ¦Àû ¸ð¼øÀ» ³º¾Ò´ÂÁö¸¦ ±Ô¸íÇÏ¿©, Çѱ¹°æÁ¦»ç¿¡¼­ ¹àÈ÷·Á°í ÇÏ¿´´Ù. À̸¦ À§ÇØ Àü½Ã°æÁ¦±â È­Æó°æÁ¦ÀÇ »óȲÀ» È­ÆóÀÇ °úÀ×ÁýÀûÀ̶ó´Â °³³äÀ¸·Î ¼³¸íÇÏ¿´´Ù. °ø½Ä¹°°¡ÀÇ »ó½ÂÀÌ ÀÎÀ§ÀûÀ¸·Î ¾ïÁ¦µÇ°í ¹°ÀÚºÎÁ·ÀÌ ±Ø½ÉÇÏ¿© ¹è±ÞÁ¦°¡ ÀÌ·ç¾îÁö°í ÀÖ´ø ´ç½Ã¿¡ ¹Î°£Àº È­Æ並 Çö±ÝÀ¸·Î º¸À¯Çϰųª ÀºÇà¿¡ ¿¹±ÝÇÏ¿´´Ù. ´õ¿íÀÌ ÀÏÁ¦°¡ ÀüÀï¼öÇàÀÚ±ÝÀÇ Á¶´ÞÀ» º»¿øÅëÈ­¹ßÇà¿¡ ÀÇÁ¸ÇÏ´Â Á¤µµ¸¦ ÁÙÀÌ°í ½ÃÁßÀÇ À¯µ¿¼ºÀ» Èí¼öÇϱâ À§ÇØ ½ÃÇàÇß´ø °­Á¦ÀúÃàÁ¤Ã¥Àº ¹Î°£ÀÇ ¿¹±ÝÀ» Å©°Ô Áõ°¡½ÃÄ×´Ù. Àü½ÃÅëÁ¦°æÁ¦¿¡¼­ ¹Î°£ºÎ¹®¿¡ ÀúÃà°ú Çö±ÝÀÌ ÁýÀûµÇ´Â Çö»óÀº ÅëÁ¦Ã¼Á¦°¡ À¯ÁöµÇ´Â ±â°£Áß¿¡´Â ÀÎÇ÷¹À̼ÇÀÇ ¾ïÁ¦¿¡ Å©°Ô ±â¿©ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ¾ú´Ù. ±×·¯³ª ÀÌ¿Í °°ÀÌ °úÀ×ÁýÀûµÈ È­Æó´Â ÅëÁ¦Ã¼Á¦°¡ Å©°Ô À̿ϵǰųª ºØ±«µÇ´Â ½Ã±â°¡ µÇ¸é ¹°°¡ÆøµîÀÇ °¡Àå Áß¿äÇÑ ¿äÀÎÀÌ µÈ´Ù. À̷κÎÅÍ Çѱ¹¿¡¼­ Çعæ Á÷ÈÄ ¹ß»ýÇÑ ¹°°¡ÆøµîÀº Á¤Ä¡»çȸÀû ¿äÀΰú ½Ç¹°Àû ¿äÀÎ ÀÌ¿Ü¿¡µµ ÀºÇà¿¡¼­ ÀϽÿ¡ ¿¹±ÝÀÌ ÀÎÃâµÇ¾î È­ÆóÀ¯Åë·®ÀÌ ±ÞÁõÇÏ´Â È­ÆóÀû ¿äÀÎÀÌ ¸Å¿ì Áß¿äÇÏ´Ù°í º¼ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù.
    Inter-Korean Economic Relation: Rivaled Past, Unbalanced Present, and Integrated Future
    Doowon Lee
    Pages 131-160
  • Abstract || PDF
    •    South Korea and North Korea have competed vigorously against each other in almost every field since the establishments of both governments in 1948. This paper reviews the past economic rivalry between the two governments. a rivalry which the North dominated in the 1950s and 69s until the South gradually took the lead which it still holds. Throughout the 1980s, South Korea has experienced miraculous economic success while North Korea has suffered from the inefficiencies of a centrally planned economy along with the problems caused by an unbalanced development strategy. Currently, it is clear that the successful South Korean economy not merely has surpassed the troubled North Korean economy, but also is a dominant position in almost every other aspect. Based on the assumption that the current nuclear issue is resolved peacefully, this paper discusses some prospects for the future inter-Korean economic cooperation.


The Korean Journal of Economics, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 1995)