Çѱ¹°æÁ¦Çк¸ Á¦ 25±Ç, Á¦ 2È£ (2018³â °¡À»)
Chulyoung Kim, S. David Kim, and Sangyoon Nam
Pages 61-84
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Abstract ( Eng | Kor ) || PDF
- Strict Liability, Settlement, and Moral Concern
Chulyoung Kim, S. David Kim, and Sangyoon Nam
We investigate the consequences of introducing a settlement stage
to the environment of Deffains and Fluet (2013) in which an
injurer has moral concern about harming a victim. Focusing on
the unique interior solution, we characterize the Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium that has a cutoff property: high-moral types are
willing to settle whereas low-moral types reject the victim¡¯s
settlement offer and proceed to trial. We show that the injurer¡¯s
equilibrium level of precautionary effort increases as the injurer¡¯s
moral type increases and becomes constant at the marginal
moral-type who is indifferent between settlement and trial. We
also discuss the settlement¡¯s effect in reducing the high types¡¯
precautionary effort.
- º» ³í¹®Àº Deffains¿Í Fluet (2013)ÀÇ ¸ðÇüÀ» È®ÀåÇÏ¿© ÇÕÀÇ ´Ü°è¸¦ µµÀÔÇÏ°í,
±×¿¡ µû¸¥ °á°ú¸¦ ºÐ¼®ÇÑ´Ù. ¿ì¸®´Â À¯ÀÏÇÑ ³»ºÎÇØ¿¡ ÁÖ¸ñÇÏ¿© ÄÆ¿ÀÇÁ(cutoff)¸¦ °¡Áö´Â ¿ÏÀüº£ÀÌÁî±ÕÇüÀ» µµÃâÇÏ¿´´Ù. Áï, ³ôÀº µµ´ö¼ºÀ» º¸ÀÌ´Â À¯ÇüÀϼö·Ï ÇÕÀÇÇϱ⸦ ¿øÇÏÁö¸¸,
³·Àº µµ´ö¼ºÀ» º¸ÀÌ´Â À¯ÇüÀº ÇÇÇØÀÚÀÇ
ÇÕÀÇ Á¦¾ÈÀ» °ÅÀýÇÏ°í ÀçÆÇÀ¸·Î °¡±æ ¹Ù¶õ´Ù. ¿ì¸®´Â °¡ÇØÀÚÀÇ µµ´ö¼ºÀÌ ³ôÀ»¼ö·Ï °¡ÇØÀÚÀÇ ±ÕÇü¿¡¼ÀÇ ¿¹¹æÀû ³ë·Â ¼öÁØÀÌ Áõ°¡ÇÑ´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» º¸ÀÌ°í, ³ª¾Æ°¡ ÇÕÀÇÇÏ´Â °Í°ú ÀçÆÇÀ¸·Î °¡´Â °ÍÀÌ ¹«Â÷º°ÇÑ µµ´ö¼º À¯ÇüÀº ÀÏÁ¤ÇÑ ¼öÁØÀÇ
¿¹¹æÀû ³ë·ÂÀ» ±â¿ïÀÌ´Â °ÍÀ» È®ÀÎÇÑ´Ù. ¶ÇÇÑ ÇÕÀÇ ´Ü°è°¡ ³ôÀº µµ´ö¼º À¯ÇüÀÇ ¿¹¹æÀû ³ë·ÂÀ» °¨¼Ò½ÃŲ´Ù´Â »ç½ÇÀ» º¸ÀδÙ.
¼ºº´¹¬, ÀÌ°æ¿ì, ±è±¤È¯
Pages 85-118
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Abstract ( Eng | Kor ) || PDF
- Intergenerational Redistribution and Monetary
Policy with Asset Bubbles
Byeong Mook Sung, Kyung-woo Lee, and Kwang Hwan Kim
This paper analyzes the optimal policy mix when asset bubbles
exist in an overlapping-generations model with nominal rigidity.
Government redistributes income across generations through an
asset tax and transfer payments, and the central bank adjusts the
interest rate in response to asset prices. We find that if both the
government and the central bank minimize the volatility of bubble
assets¡¯ prices, the interest rate should move one-for-one with
bubble prices, but in opposite directions, whereas the
redistribution policy depends on the source of the bubble price
volatility. However, when the government minimizes the welfare
loss due to consumption volatility, it reduces the consumption gap
between the young and the old through the redistribution policy.
Finally, if both policy makers minimize the welfare loss, the
monetary policy should take into account both direct and indirect
effects of the bubble price volatility. Moreover, the redistribution
policy should consider the generational consumption gap in
addition to those effects.
- º»°í¿¡¼´Â °¡°Ý°æÁ÷¼ºÀÌ ÀÖ´Â Áßø¼¼´ë ¸ðÇü¿¡ ÀÚ»ê ¹öºíÀÌ Á¸ÀçÇÒ °æ¿ì
ÃÖÀû Á¤Ã¥¿¡ ´ëÇØ ºÐ¼®ÇÑ´Ù. Á¤ºÎ´Â Àڻ꼼¿Í ÀÌÀüÁöÃâÀ» ÅëÇØ ¼ÒµæÀ» ¼¼´ë °£¿¡ ÀçºÐ¹èÇÏ°í Áß¾ÓÀºÇàÀº Àڻ갡°Ý¿¡ ¹ÝÀÀÇÏ¿© ±Ý¸®¸¦ Á¶Á¤ÇÑ´Ù.
¸ÕÀú Á¤ºÎ¿Í Áß¾ÓÀºÇàÀÌ ¸ðµÎ ¹öºíÀÚ»ê °¡°ÝÀÇ º¯µ¿¼ºÀ» ÃÖ¼ÒÈÇÒ °æ¿ì, ±Ý¸®´Â ÀçºÐ¹è Á¤Ã¥°ú »ó°ü¾øÀÌ ¹öºíÀÚ»ê °¡°ÝÀÌ »ó½ÂÇÑ ¸¸Å ÀÎÇϵǰí,
ÀçºÐ¹è Á¤Ã¥Àº ¹öºíÀÚ»ê °¡°Ý º¯µ¿¼ºÀÇ ¿øõ¿¡ µû¶ó °áÁ¤µÈ´Ù. ¹Ý¸é¿¡ Á¤ºÎ´Â
¼Òºñ º¯µ¿¼ºÀ¸·Î ÀÎÇÑ ÈÄ»ý¼Õ½ÇÀ» ÃÖ¼ÒÈÇÒ °æ¿ì, ³ë³âÃþ¿¡ ´Ù¼Ò À¯¸®ÇÑ
ÀçºÐ¹è Á¤Ã¥À» ÅëÇØ Ã»³âÃþ°ú ³ë³âÃþÀÇ ¼Òºñ °ÝÂ÷¸¦ ÁÙÀδÙ. ¸¶Áö¸·À¸·Î
Á¤ºÎ¿Í Áß¾ÓÀºÇàÀÌ ¸ðµÎ ÈÄ»ý¼Õ½ÇÀ» ÃÖ¼ÒÈÇÒ °æ¿ì, ÅëÈÁ¤Ã¥Àº ¹öºíÀÚ»ê
°¡°Ý º¯µ¿¼ºÀÇ Á÷°£Á¢ È¿°ú¸¦ ¸ðµÎ °í·ÁÇØ¾ß ÇÏ°í, ÀçºÐ¹è Á¤Ã¥Àº ±×¿¡
´õÇÏ¿© ¼¼´ë °£ ¼Òºñ °ÝÂ÷±îÁö °í·ÁÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù.
À̺´Ã¤
Pages 119-136
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Abstract ( Eng | Kor ) || PDF
- Immigration Incentive in the Local Public Good Economy
Byungchae Rhee
It is frequently observed that there is considerable difference
between local communities. The previous literature has been
focusing on the immigration incentive of an individual using the
so-called ¡°voting-with-feet¡± model, in which each community is
exogenously given a certain level of local public goods. Adopting
the optimal feasible taxation model in Rhee (2008, 2012), we
analyse the immigration incentive of an individual whose wealth
characteristics are observable. The analysis shows that each
individual always wants to form a community with another
individual who is more likely to be rich. This incentive may
aggravate segregation between local communities.
- Áö¹æÀÚÄ¡Á¦°¡ µµÀÔµÈ ÀÌÈÄ Áö¿ª °£ °ÝÂ÷°¡ ¹ß»ýÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Ù. ÁֹεéÀº ÀÚ½Å
¿¡°Ô °¡Àå Å« È¿¿ëÀ» °¡Á®´ÙÁÖ´Â Áö¿ªÀ¸·Î ÀÌÁÖÇÒ À¯ÀÎÀÌ Áõ°¡ÇÏ°í Àִ°ÍÀÌ´Ù.
±âÁ¸ ¿¬±¸µéÀº Áö¿ª ¼±Åà ¶Ç´Â ÀÌÁÖÀÇ ¹®Á¦¸¦ Áö¿ª°ø°øÀç °ø±Þ ¼öÁØÀÌ ÁÖ¾îÁø °æ¿ì,
¹ß·Î ÇÏ´Â ÅõÇ¥(voting with feet)·Î ¸ðÇüÈÇÏ´Â ¿Ü»ýÀû Á¢±ÙÀÌ ÁÖ¸¦ ÀÌ·é´Ù.
º» ³í¹®Àº Rhee(2008, 2012)¿¡¼ ¼Ò°³µÈ ÀûÇÕÇÑ ÃÖÀûÁ¶¼¼ ¸ðÇü(Optimal Feasible Taxation)À» ÀÌ¿ëÇÏ¿© ÇÑ
ÁÖ¹ÎÀÇ ³»»ýÀû ÀÌÁÖ À¯ÀÎÀ» °£´ÜÇÑ ¸ðÇüÀ» ÅëÇØ »ìÆ캻´Ù. ºÐ¼® °á°ú,
¼Òµæ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¿ÜÇüÀû Ư¡À» °üÂûÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â °æ¿ì ÀÌÁÖ À¯ÀÎÀº Áö¿ª °£ ½ò¸²Çö»óÀ»
°¡Á®¿Í Áö¿ª °£ °ÝÂ÷¸¦ ½ÉȽÃŲ´Ù.
The Korean Journal of Economics, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2018)