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    Strict Liability, Settlement, and Moral Concern
    Chulyoung Kim, S. David Kim, and Sangyoon Nam
    Pages 61-84
  • Abstract ( Eng | Kor ) || PDF
    • Strict Liability, Settlement, and Moral Concern
      Chulyoung Kim, S. David Kim, and Sangyoon Nam


         We investigate the consequences of introducing a settlement stage to the environment of Deffains and Fluet (2013) in which an injurer has moral concern about harming a victim. Focusing on the unique interior solution, we characterize the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium that has a cutoff property: high-moral types are willing to settle whereas low-moral types reject the victim¡¯s settlement offer and proceed to trial. We show that the injurer¡¯s equilibrium level of precautionary effort increases as the injurer¡¯s moral type increases and becomes constant at the marginal moral-type who is indifferent between settlement and trial. We also discuss the settlement¡¯s effect in reducing the high types¡¯ precautionary effort.
    •    º» ³í¹®Àº Deffains¿Í Fluet (2013)ÀÇ ¸ðÇüÀ» È®ÀåÇÏ¿© ÇÕÀÇ ´Ü°è¸¦ µµÀÔÇÏ°í, ±×¿¡ µû¸¥ °á°ú¸¦ ºÐ¼®ÇÑ´Ù. ¿ì¸®´Â À¯ÀÏÇÑ ³»ºÎÇØ¿¡ ÁÖ¸ñÇÏ¿© ÄÆ¿ÀÇÁ(cutoff)¸¦ °¡Áö´Â ¿ÏÀüº£ÀÌÁî±ÕÇüÀ» µµÃâÇÏ¿´´Ù. Áï, ³ôÀº µµ´ö¼ºÀ» º¸ÀÌ´Â À¯ÇüÀϼö·Ï ÇÕÀÇÇϱ⸦ ¿øÇÏÁö¸¸, ³·Àº µµ´ö¼ºÀ» º¸ÀÌ´Â À¯ÇüÀº ÇÇÇØÀÚÀÇ ÇÕÀÇ Á¦¾ÈÀ» °ÅÀýÇÏ°í ÀçÆÇÀ¸·Î °¡±æ ¹Ù¶õ´Ù. ¿ì¸®´Â °¡ÇØÀÚÀÇ µµ´ö¼ºÀÌ ³ôÀ»¼ö·Ï °¡ÇØÀÚÀÇ ±ÕÇü¿¡¼­ÀÇ ¿¹¹æÀû ³ë·Â ¼öÁØÀÌ Áõ°¡ÇÑ´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» º¸ÀÌ°í, ³ª¾Æ°¡ ÇÕÀÇÇÏ´Â °Í°ú ÀçÆÇÀ¸·Î °¡´Â °ÍÀÌ ¹«Â÷º°ÇÑ µµ´ö¼º À¯ÇüÀº ÀÏÁ¤ÇÑ ¼öÁØÀÇ ¿¹¹æÀû ³ë·ÂÀ» ±â¿ïÀÌ´Â °ÍÀ» È®ÀÎÇÑ´Ù. ¶ÇÇÑ ÇÕÀÇ ´Ü°è°¡ ³ôÀº µµ´ö¼º À¯ÇüÀÇ ¿¹¹æÀû ³ë·ÂÀ» °¨¼Ò½ÃŲ´Ù´Â »ç½ÇÀ» º¸ÀδÙ.
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    Pages 85-118
  • Abstract ( Eng | Kor ) || PDF
    • Intergenerational Redistribution and Monetary Policy with Asset Bubbles
      Byeong Mook Sung, Kyung-woo Lee, and Kwang Hwan Kim


         This paper analyzes the optimal policy mix when asset bubbles exist in an overlapping-generations model with nominal rigidity. Government redistributes income across generations through an asset tax and transfer payments, and the central bank adjusts the interest rate in response to asset prices. We find that if both the government and the central bank minimize the volatility of bubble assets¡¯ prices, the interest rate should move one-for-one with bubble prices, but in opposite directions, whereas the redistribution policy depends on the source of the bubble price volatility. However, when the government minimizes the welfare loss due to consumption volatility, it reduces the consumption gap between the young and the old through the redistribution policy. Finally, if both policy makers minimize the welfare loss, the monetary policy should take into account both direct and indirect effects of the bubble price volatility. Moreover, the redistribution policy should consider the generational consumption gap in addition to those effects.
    •    º»°í¿¡¼­´Â °¡°Ý°æÁ÷¼ºÀÌ ÀÖ´Â Áßø¼¼´ë ¸ðÇü¿¡ ÀÚ»ê ¹öºíÀÌ Á¸ÀçÇÒ °æ¿ì ÃÖÀû Á¤Ã¥¿¡ ´ëÇØ ºÐ¼®ÇÑ´Ù. Á¤ºÎ´Â Àڻ꼼¿Í ÀÌÀüÁöÃâÀ» ÅëÇØ ¼ÒµæÀ» ¼¼´ë °£¿¡ ÀçºÐ¹èÇÏ°í Áß¾ÓÀºÇàÀº Àڻ갡°Ý¿¡ ¹ÝÀÀÇÏ¿© ±Ý¸®¸¦ Á¶Á¤ÇÑ´Ù. ¸ÕÀú Á¤ºÎ¿Í Áß¾ÓÀºÇàÀÌ ¸ðµÎ ¹öºíÀÚ»ê °¡°ÝÀÇ º¯µ¿¼ºÀ» ÃÖ¼ÒÈ­ÇÒ °æ¿ì, ±Ý¸®´Â ÀçºÐ¹è Á¤Ã¥°ú »ó°ü¾øÀÌ ¹öºíÀÚ»ê °¡°ÝÀÌ »ó½ÂÇÑ ¸¸Å­ ÀÎÇϵǰí, ÀçºÐ¹è Á¤Ã¥Àº ¹öºíÀÚ»ê °¡°Ý º¯µ¿¼ºÀÇ ¿øõ¿¡ µû¶ó °áÁ¤µÈ´Ù. ¹Ý¸é¿¡ Á¤ºÎ´Â ¼Òºñ º¯µ¿¼ºÀ¸·Î ÀÎÇÑ ÈÄ»ý¼Õ½ÇÀ» ÃÖ¼ÒÈ­ÇÒ °æ¿ì, ³ë³âÃþ¿¡ ´Ù¼Ò À¯¸®ÇÑ ÀçºÐ¹è Á¤Ã¥À» ÅëÇØ Ã»³âÃþ°ú ³ë³âÃþÀÇ ¼Òºñ °ÝÂ÷¸¦ ÁÙÀδÙ. ¸¶Áö¸·À¸·Î Á¤ºÎ¿Í Áß¾ÓÀºÇàÀÌ ¸ðµÎ ÈÄ»ý¼Õ½ÇÀ» ÃÖ¼ÒÈ­ÇÒ °æ¿ì, ÅëÈ­Á¤Ã¥Àº ¹öºíÀÚ»ê °¡°Ý º¯µ¿¼ºÀÇ Á÷°£Á¢ È¿°ú¸¦ ¸ðµÎ °í·ÁÇØ¾ß ÇÏ°í, ÀçºÐ¹è Á¤Ã¥Àº ±×¿¡ ´õÇÏ¿© ¼¼´ë °£ ¼Òºñ °ÝÂ÷±îÁö °í·ÁÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù.
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    Pages 119-136
  • Abstract ( Eng | Kor ) || PDF
    • Immigration Incentive in the Local Public Good Economy
      Byungchae Rhee


         It is frequently observed that there is considerable difference between local communities. The previous literature has been focusing on the immigration incentive of an individual using the so-called ¡°voting-with-feet¡± model, in which each community is exogenously given a certain level of local public goods. Adopting the optimal feasible taxation model in Rhee (2008, 2012), we analyse the immigration incentive of an individual whose wealth characteristics are observable. The analysis shows that each individual always wants to form a community with another individual who is more likely to be rich. This incentive may aggravate segregation between local communities.
    •    Áö¹æÀÚÄ¡Á¦°¡ µµÀÔµÈ ÀÌÈÄ Áö¿ª °£ °ÝÂ÷°¡ ¹ß»ýÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Ù. ÁֹεéÀº ÀڽŠ¿¡°Ô °¡Àå Å« È¿¿ëÀ» °¡Á®´ÙÁÖ´Â Áö¿ªÀ¸·Î ÀÌÁÖÇÒ À¯ÀÎÀÌ Áõ°¡ÇÏ°í Àִ°ÍÀÌ´Ù. ±âÁ¸ ¿¬±¸µéÀº Áö¿ª ¼±Åà ¶Ç´Â ÀÌÁÖÀÇ ¹®Á¦¸¦ Áö¿ª°ø°øÀç °ø±Þ ¼öÁØÀÌ ÁÖ¾îÁø °æ¿ì, ¹ß·Î ÇÏ´Â ÅõÇ¥(voting with feet)·Î ¸ðÇüÈ­ÇÏ´Â ¿Ü»ýÀû Á¢±ÙÀÌ ÁÖ¸¦ ÀÌ·é´Ù. º» ³í¹®Àº Rhee(2008, 2012)¿¡¼­ ¼Ò°³µÈ ÀûÇÕÇÑ ÃÖÀûÁ¶¼¼ ¸ðÇü(Optimal Feasible Taxation)À» ÀÌ¿ëÇÏ¿© ÇÑ ÁÖ¹ÎÀÇ ³»»ýÀû ÀÌÁÖ À¯ÀÎÀ» °£´ÜÇÑ ¸ðÇüÀ» ÅëÇØ »ìÆ캻´Ù. ºÐ¼® °á°ú, ¼Òµæ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¿ÜÇüÀû Ư¡À» °üÂûÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â °æ¿ì ÀÌÁÖ À¯ÀÎÀº Áö¿ª °£ ½ò¸²Çö»óÀ» °¡Á®¿Í Áö¿ª °£ °ÝÂ÷¸¦ ½ÉÈ­½ÃŲ´Ù.


The Korean Journal of Economics, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2018)