Çѱ¹°æÁ¦Çк¸ Á¦ 20±Ç, Á¦ 2È£ (2013³â °¡À»)
Seonghoon Cho
Pages 119-160
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Abstract ( Eng | Kor ) || PDF
- This paper reexamines the aspect of expectational stability as an
alternative economic refinement scheme of rational expectations
(RE) solutions to determinacy. While expectational stability (ES)
has been a powerful economic guidance for understanding RE
models, it is not the sole alternative to determinacy since it is
well-known that more than one solution can be expectationally
stable (E-stable), particularly in the case of indeterminacy. In this
paper, we also show that the concept of Expectational stability
depends inherently on the representation of a RE model in a
multivariate linear RE framework. The reason is that the extent of
an overparameterization of a perceived law of motion (PLM)
formed by economic agents to learn about the REE can vary
across alternative representations of a RE model. This implies that
one may draw different conclusions on E-stability of a REE to a
model when represented alternatively. This aspect of
overparameterization differs from what is known as the
distinction of weak and strong E-stability where different
functional forms of PLM are studied. We examine how robust are
the E-stability results across different representations and
emphasize that the information contents of the learning agents
matter in study of E-stability for linear RE models.
- ´Ùº¯¼ö ¼±Çü ÇÕ¸®Àû ±â´ë¸ðÇü¿¡¼ ±â´ë
¾ÈÁ¤¼º(Expectational Stability)°ú °áÁ¤¼º(Determinacy)¿¡ °üÇÑ ¿¬±¸
Á¶¼ºÈÆ
º» ¿¬±¸´Â ¼±Çü ÇÕ¸®Àû ±â´ë ¸ðÇü¿¡¼ ÇØ(solution)¸¦ ¼±ÅÃÇÒ ¶§ °áÁ¤¼º(determinacy)¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ´ë¾ÈÀ¸·Î¼ Àß ¾Ë·ÁÁ® ÀÖ´Â
±â´ë ¾ÈÁ¤¼º(expectational stability)ÀÇ Æ¯¼ºÀ» Àç°ËÁõÇÏ°íÀÚ ÇÑ´Ù. ±â´ë ¾ÈÁ¤¼ºÀº ÇÕ¸®Àû ±â´ë ¸ðÇüÀ» ÀÌÇØÇϴµ¥ ÀÖ¾î¼
¸Å¿ì Áß¿äÇÑ ¿ªÇÒÀ» ÇÏÁö¸¸ ±â´ë ¾ÈÁ¤¼ºÀ» ¸¸Á·ÇÏ´Â º¹¼öÀÇ ÇØ°¡ Á¸ÀçÇÒ ¼ö Àֱ⠶§¹®¿¡ °áÁ¤¼º¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¿ÏÀüÇÑ ´ë¾ÈÀÌ µÇÁö
¸øÇϴµ¥, ƯÈ÷ º¹¼öÀÇ ¾ÈÁ¤Àû ÇØ°¡ Á¸ÀçÇÏ´Â ºñ°áÁ¤¼º(indeterminate) ¸ðÇüÀÇ °æ¿ì¿¡ ´õ¿í ´õ ±×·¸´Ù.
º» ¿¬±¸¿¡¼´Â µ¿ÀÏÇÑ ¸ðÇü¿¡¼µµ ¸ðÇüÀÇ Ç¥Çö¹æ½Ä¿¡ µû¶ó ±â´ë ¾ÈÁ¤¼ºÀÌ ¼·Î ´Ù¸¥ °á°ú¸¦ ÁÙ ¼ö ÀÖÀ½À» º¸ÀδÙ. ±× ÀÌÀ¯´Â
¼·Î ´Ù¸¥ ¸ðÇüÀÇ Ç¥ÇöÀº °æÁ¦ÁÖü°¡ ÀνÄÇÏ´Â ÇØÀÇ °è¼ö¸¦ ÇнÀ(learning)Çϴµ¥ ÀÖ¾î¼ ¼±ÅÃÇÏ´Â »óź¯¼öµé¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Á¤º¸°¡
¾Ï¹¬ÀûÀ¸·Î ¼·Î ´Ù¸£±â ¶§¹®ÀÌ´Ù. ¾à(weak) ±â´ë ¾ÈÁ¤¼º°ú °(strong) ±â´ë ¾ÈÁ¤¼ºÀÌ ´Ù¸£´Ù´Â °ÍÀº Àß ¾Ë·ÁÁ® ÀÖÁö¸¸ ÀÌ´Â
°æÁ¦ÁÖü°¡ ÀνÄÇÏ´Â ÇØÀÇ ÇüÅ°¡ ´Ù¸£±â ¶§¹®¿¡ ÀϾ´Â ´ç¿¬ÇÑ Çö»óÀÌ´Ù. ±×·¯³ª º» ¿¬±¸¿¡¼´Â
°æÁ¦ÁÖü°¡ ÀνÄÇÏ´Â ÇØÀÇ ÇüÅ°¡ µ¿ÀÏÇÑ °æ¿ì¿¡µµ ±â´ë ¾ÈÁ¤¼ºÀÇ Á¤µµ°¡
´Ù¸£°í ÀÌ¿¡ µû¶ó ƯÁ¤ ÇØ°¡ ¸ðÇüÀÇ Ç¥Çö¹æ½Ä¿¡ µû¶ó ¾ÈÁ¤¼ºÀ» °¡Áú ¼öµµ ÀÖ°í ±×·¸Áö ¾ÊÀ» ¼öµµ ÀÖÀ½À» º¸ÀδÙ.
º» ¿¬±¸¿¡¼´Â ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ Æ¯¼ºÀÌ ±â´ë ¾ÈÁ¤¼ºÀÇ ¹®Á¦Á¡À̶ó±âº¸´Ù °æÁ¦ÁÖü°¡ ÀνÄÇÏ´Â ÇØ¿¡¼ ¾²ÀÌ´Â Á¤º¸¸¦ ¸íÈ®ÇÏ°Ô ³ªÅ¸³»Áö ¾Ê´Â °üÇà ¶§¹®À̸ç
ÇнÀ°ü·Ã ¿¬±¸¿¡¼ Á¤º¸¸¦ ¸íÈ®È÷ ¼³Á¤ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀÌ ÇÊ¿äÇÔÀ» ÁÖÀåÇÑ´Ù.
Donghun Kim, Osamu Yoshioka
Pages 161-185
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Abstract ( Eng | Kor ) || PDF
- We estimate an oligopoly model for the 1M DRAM market and
measure variations in market power over the various stages of the
product life cycle. In the model, we consider the impacts of
economies of scale, learning-by-doing, and spillover as characteristics
of firms' marginal costs, and we take into account their
varying effects over the product life cycle. We verify that market
power varies over the product life cycle such that it is higher at
the beginning, eventually weakens in the middle, and strengthens
slightly at the end. The empirical results confirm that learning-by-doing
and spillover effects are prevalent, and their effects are
stronger at the beginning and weaker at the end of the product
life cycle.
- Á¦Ç°»ý¸íÁֱ⿡ µû¸¥ ½ÃÀåÁö¹è·ÂÀÇ µ¿ÅÂÀû
º¯È°úÁ¤¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¿¬±¸: DRAM »ê¾÷À» Áß½ÉÀ¸·Î
±èµ¿ÈÆ, Osamu Yoshioka
³í¹®Àº Á¦Ç°»ý¸í Áֱ⿡ µû¸¥ ½ÃÀåÁö¹è·ÂÀÇ º¯È°úÁ¤À» °íÂûÇϱâ À§ÇÏ¿©
µ¿ÅÂÀû °úÁ¡¸ðÇüÀ» ¼³Á¤ÇÏ°í 1¸Þ°¡ DRAMÀ» Áß½ÉÀ¸·Î ½ÇÁõºÐ¼® ÇÏ¿´´Ù. ÇÑ°èºñ¿ë ¼³Á¤¿¡ ÀÖ¾î¼ ±Ô¸ðÀÇ °æÁ¦, °æÇè¿¡ ÀÇÇÑ ÇнÀ(learning-by-doing),
±â¼úÈ®»ê(spillover)È¿°ú¸¦ °í·ÁÇÏ¿´À¸¸ç À̵éÀÌ Á¦Ç° »ý¸íÁֱ⿡ µû¶ó ¾î¶»°Ô º¯ÈÇÏ´ÂÁö ºÐ¼®ÇÏ¿´´Ù. 1¸Þ°¡ DRAM»ê¾÷ÀÇ °æ¿ì ½ÃÀåÁö¹è·ÂÀº
Á¦Ç°»ý¸íÁֱ⸦ µû¶ó º¯ÈÇÏ´Â °ÍÀÌ Áõ¸íÀÌ µÇ¾úÀ¸¸ç »ý¸íÁÖ±â Ãʹݿ¡ ³ô°í Áß°£¿¡ »ç¶óÁ³´Ù°¡ »ý¸íÁÖ±â ÈĹݿ¡ ¼ÒÆøÀ¸·Î Áõ°¡ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ¸·Î
³ªÅ¸³ª°í ÀÖ´Ù. °æÇè¿¡ ÀÇÇÑ ÇнÀÈ¿°ú³ª ±â¼úÈ®»ê È¿°ú´Â Á¦Ç°»ý¸íÁÖ±â Àü¹Ý¿¡ °ÇÏ°Ô ³ªÅ¸³ª°í ÀÖÀ¸¸ç ÈĹݿ¡´Â ¾àÇØÁö´Â °ÍÀ¸·Î ÃßÁ¤ÀÌ µÇ¾ú´Ù.
Á¶ÇʱÔ
Pages 187-212
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Abstract ( Eng | Kor ) || PDF
- Hayek's Spontaneous Order and Cooperative Behavior Rule
Pil Kyoo Jo
Hayek's theory of cultural evolution should demonstrate that
spontaneous social order is the result of the individual selection
and the market order can satisfy the condition under which
cooperative behavior rules can be selected. However, for the fact
that the market transactions are usually carried out by a lot of
anonymous persons, the condition is difficult to be satisfied in
market order. But it dose not mean that market order cannot but
be inefficient. There may be particular conditions under which the
cooperative agents can survive, and it suggests that institution
design be necessary for the conditions under which the market
transaction can result in benefit order. Market is embedded
among many other social institutions, and market order is not
spontaneous in itself, but should be understood in the process of
interaction with the surrounding social institutions.
- ÇÏÀÌ¿¡Å©ÀÇ ¹®ÈÁøÈ·ÐÀÌ ÀÌ·ÐÀû Á¤ÇÕ¼ºÀ» È®º¸Çϱâ À§Çؼ´Â ÀÚ»ýÀû Áú¼°¡ °³Ã¼¼±º°ÀÇ °á°úÀ̸é¼
µ¿½Ã¿¡ ½ÃÀåÁú¼ÇÏ¿¡¼ ÇùÁ¶Àû ÇàÀ§±ÔÄ¢ÀÌ ¼±º°µÉ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â Á¶°ÇÀÌ ÃæÁ·µÉ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» ³íÁõÇؾ߸¸ ÇÑ´Ù. ±×·¯³ª ½ÃÀå°Å·¡°¡
À͸íÀû ´Ù¼ö¿¡ ÀÇÇؼ °Å·¡µÈ´Ù´Â Ư¼ºÀ» °í·ÁÇÒ ¶§ ÀÚ»ýÀû ½ÃÀå°úÁ¤ ¼Ó¿¡¼ ÇùÁ¶Àû ÇàÀ§±ÔÄ¢ÀÌ ¼±º°µÉ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â Á¶°ÇÀÌ ÃæÁ·µÇ±â ¾î·Æ´Ù.
±×·¸´Ù°í ÀÌ°ÍÀÌ ½ÃÀåÁú¼°¡ ¹Ýµå½Ã ºñÈ¿À²ÀûÀÏ ¼ö¹Û¿¡ ¾ø´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» ÀǹÌÇÏÁö´Â ¾Ê´Â´Ù. »çȸÀÇ Æ¯Á¤ Á¦µµÀû Á¶°ÇÇÏ¿¡¼ ÇùÁ¶Àû ÇàÀ§±ÔÄ¢Àº »ýÁ¸ÇÒ
¼ö ÀÖ°í, ÀÌ´Â ½ÃÀå°Å·¡°¡ È¿À²Àû °á°ú¸¦ ³º±â À§Çؼ´Â ÇùÁ¶Àû ÇàÀ§±ÔÄ¢ÀÇ ¼±º° Á¶°ÇÀ¸·Î¼ÀÇ ÀûÀýÇÑ Á¦µµ¼³°è°¡ ÇÊ¿äÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» ÀǹÌÇÑ´Ù.
½ÃÀå ¿ª½Ã ¿©·¯ Á¦µµµé °¡¿îµ¥ ÇϳªÀ̸ç, ½ÃÀåÁú¼´Â ±× ÀÚü·Î ÀÚ»ýÀûÀ̱⺸´Ù´Â ½ÃÀåÀ» µÑ·¯½Ñ ´Ù¸¥ Á¦µµµé°úÀÇ »óÈ£ÀÛ¿ë °úÁ¤ ¼Ó¿¡¼ ÀÌÇصǾî¾ß ÇÑ´Ù.
Á¶¼º¿ø
Pages 213-246
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Abstract ( Eng | Kor ) || PDF
- Firm's Optimal Capital Structure and the
Optimal Government Debt Ratio
Sungwon Cho
This paper estimates the optimal government debt ratio of
Korea using an economic model based on an optimal capital
structure theory in corporate finance literature. Empirical results
indicate that there exists a nonlinear inverse relationship
between the government debt ratio and social welfare, which
implies that optimal government debt ratio could exist.
Estimation result using the time-series data of government debt
in Korea resulted in an optimal government debt ratio of 21%,
which means that social welfare in Korea is maximized at this
specific debt ratio.
- º» ¿¬±¸¿¡¼´Â ±â¾÷ÀÇ ÃÖÀûÀÚº»±¸Á¶ÀÌ·ÐÀ» ±¹°¡Ã¤¹« ¹®Á¦¿¡ Àû¿ëÇÏ¿© »çȸÈÄ»ýÀÌ ±Ø´ëȵǴ ¿ì¸®³ª¶óÀÇ ÀûÁ¤ ±¹°¡Ã¤¹«ºñÀ²À» ÃßÁ¤ÇÏ¿´´Ù.
º» ¿¬±¸ÀÇ ÁÖ¿ä ºÐ¼®°á°ú´Â ´ÙÀ½°ú °°´Ù. ù°, ¿ì¸®³ª¶óÀÇ °æ¿ì, ±¹°¡Ã¤¹«ºñÀ²°ú »çȸÈÄ»ý °£¿¡ ¿ª UÀÚ ÇüÅÂÀÇ ºñ¼±Çü°ü°è°¡ ¼º¸³ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ¸·Î
ºÐ¼®µÇ¾î »çȸÈÄ»ýÀÌ ±Ø´ëȵǴ ÀûÁ¤ ±¹°¡Ã¤¹«ºñÀ²ÀÌ Á¸ÀçÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖÀ½À» º¸¿©ÁÖ¾ú´Ù. µÑ°, ±¹°¡Ã¤¹« ½Ã°è¿ ÀڷḦ È°¿ëÇÏ¿© ÀûÁ¤Ã¤¹«ºñÀ²À» ÃßÁ¤ÇÑ °á°ú,
¿ì¸®³ª¶óÀÇ ÀûÁ¤ ±¹°¡Ã¤¹«ºñÀ²Àº 21%·Î »êÁ¤µÇ¾ú´Ù. ÀÌ´Â GDP ´ëºñ ±¹°¡Ã¤¹«ºñÀ²ÀÌ 21%ÀÏ ¶§, ¿ì¸®³ª¶óÀÇ »çȸÈÄ»ýÀÌ ±Ø´ëȵȴٴ °ÍÀ» ÀǹÌÇϸç,
±¹°¡Ã¤¹«ÀÇ ÁßÀå±â ¸ñÇ¥¼öÁØÀ» ÀÌ¿Í °°Àº ÀûÁ¤ºñÀ²¿¡ ¸ÂÃç ±¹°¡Ã¤¹«¸¦ °ü¸®ÇØ ³ª°¥ ÇÊ¿ä°¡ ÀÖÀ½À» ½Ã»çÇÑ´Ù.
The Korean Journal of Economics, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Autumn 2013)