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    Expectational Stability and Determinacy in Multivariate Linear Rational Expectations Models
    Seonghoon Cho
    Pages 119-160
  • Abstract ( Eng | Kor ) || PDF
    •    This paper reexamines the aspect of expectational stability as an alternative economic refinement scheme of rational expectations (RE) solutions to determinacy. While expectational stability (ES) has been a powerful economic guidance for understanding RE models, it is not the sole alternative to determinacy since it is well-known that more than one solution can be expectationally stable (E-stable), particularly in the case of indeterminacy. In this paper, we also show that the concept of Expectational stability depends inherently on the representation of a RE model in a multivariate linear RE framework. The reason is that the extent of an overparameterization of a perceived law of motion (PLM) formed by economic agents to learn about the REE can vary across alternative representations of a RE model. This implies that one may draw different conclusions on E-stability of a REE to a model when represented alternatively. This aspect of overparameterization differs from what is known as the distinction of weak and strong E-stability where different functional forms of PLM are studied. We examine how robust are the E-stability results across different representations and emphasize that the information contents of the learning agents matter in study of E-stability for linear RE models.
    • ´Ùº¯¼ö ¼±Çü ÇÕ¸®Àû ±â´ë¸ðÇü¿¡¼­ ±â´ë ¾ÈÁ¤¼º(Expectational Stability)°ú °áÁ¤¼º(Determinacy)¿¡ °üÇÑ ¿¬±¸
      Á¶¼ºÈÆ


         º» ¿¬±¸´Â ¼±Çü ÇÕ¸®Àû ±â´ë ¸ðÇü¿¡¼­ ÇØ(solution)¸¦ ¼±ÅÃÇÒ ¶§ °áÁ¤¼º(determinacy)¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ´ë¾ÈÀ¸·Î¼­ Àß ¾Ë·ÁÁ® ÀÖ´Â ±â´ë ¾ÈÁ¤¼º(expectational stability)ÀÇ Æ¯¼ºÀ» Àç°ËÁõÇÏ°íÀÚ ÇÑ´Ù. ±â´ë ¾ÈÁ¤¼ºÀº ÇÕ¸®Àû ±â´ë ¸ðÇüÀ» ÀÌÇØÇϴµ¥ À־ ¸Å¿ì Áß¿äÇÑ ¿ªÇÒÀ» ÇÏÁö¸¸ ±â´ë ¾ÈÁ¤¼ºÀ» ¸¸Á·ÇÏ´Â º¹¼öÀÇ ÇØ°¡ Á¸ÀçÇÒ ¼ö Àֱ⠶§¹®¿¡ °áÁ¤¼º¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¿ÏÀüÇÑ ´ë¾ÈÀÌ µÇÁö ¸øÇϴµ¥, ƯÈ÷ º¹¼öÀÇ ¾ÈÁ¤Àû ÇØ°¡ Á¸ÀçÇÏ´Â ºñ°áÁ¤¼º(indeterminate) ¸ðÇüÀÇ °æ¿ì¿¡ ´õ¿í ´õ ±×·¸´Ù. º» ¿¬±¸¿¡¼­´Â µ¿ÀÏÇÑ ¸ðÇü¿¡¼­µµ ¸ðÇüÀÇ Ç¥Çö¹æ½Ä¿¡ µû¶ó ±â´ë ¾ÈÁ¤¼ºÀÌ ¼­·Î ´Ù¸¥ °á°ú¸¦ ÁÙ ¼ö ÀÖÀ½À» º¸ÀδÙ. ±× ÀÌÀ¯´Â ¼­·Î ´Ù¸¥ ¸ðÇüÀÇ Ç¥ÇöÀº °æÁ¦ÁÖü°¡ ÀνÄÇÏ´Â ÇØÀÇ °è¼ö¸¦ ÇнÀ(learning)Çϴµ¥ À־ ¼±ÅÃÇÏ´Â »óź¯¼öµé¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Á¤º¸°¡ ¾Ï¹¬ÀûÀ¸·Î ¼­·Î ´Ù¸£±â ¶§¹®ÀÌ´Ù. ¾à(weak) ±â´ë ¾ÈÁ¤¼º°ú °­(strong) ±â´ë ¾ÈÁ¤¼ºÀÌ ´Ù¸£´Ù´Â °ÍÀº Àß ¾Ë·ÁÁ® ÀÖÁö¸¸ ÀÌ´Â °æÁ¦ÁÖü°¡ ÀνÄÇÏ´Â ÇØÀÇ ÇüÅ°¡ ´Ù¸£±â ¶§¹®¿¡ ÀϾ´Â ´ç¿¬ÇÑ Çö»óÀÌ´Ù. ±×·¯³ª º» ¿¬±¸¿¡¼­´Â °æÁ¦ÁÖü°¡ ÀνÄÇÏ´Â ÇØÀÇ ÇüÅ°¡ µ¿ÀÏÇÑ °æ¿ì¿¡µµ ±â´ë ¾ÈÁ¤¼ºÀÇ Á¤µµ°¡ ´Ù¸£°í ÀÌ¿¡ µû¶ó ƯÁ¤ ÇØ°¡ ¸ðÇüÀÇ Ç¥Çö¹æ½Ä¿¡ µû¶ó ¾ÈÁ¤¼ºÀ» °¡Áú ¼öµµ ÀÖ°í ±×·¸Áö ¾ÊÀ» ¼öµµ ÀÖÀ½À» º¸ÀδÙ. º» ¿¬±¸¿¡¼­´Â ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ Æ¯¼ºÀÌ ±â´ë ¾ÈÁ¤¼ºÀÇ ¹®Á¦Á¡À̶ó±âº¸´Ù °æÁ¦ÁÖü°¡ ÀνÄÇÏ´Â ÇØ¿¡¼­ ¾²ÀÌ´Â Á¤º¸¸¦ ¸íÈ®ÇÏ°Ô ³ªÅ¸³»Áö ¾Ê´Â °üÇà ¶§¹®À̸ç ÇнÀ°ü·Ã ¿¬±¸¿¡¼­ Á¤º¸¸¦ ¸íÈ®È÷ ¼³Á¤ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀÌ ÇÊ¿äÇÔÀ» ÁÖÀåÇÑ´Ù.
    Dynamics of Market Power over the Product Life Cycle: The Case of the DRAM Industry
    Donghun Kim, Osamu Yoshioka
    Pages 161-185
  • Abstract ( Eng | Kor ) || PDF
    •    We estimate an oligopoly model for the 1M DRAM market and measure variations in market power over the various stages of the product life cycle. In the model, we consider the impacts of economies of scale, learning-by-doing, and spillover as characteristics of firms' marginal costs, and we take into account their varying effects over the product life cycle. We verify that market power varies over the product life cycle such that it is higher at the beginning, eventually weakens in the middle, and strengthens slightly at the end. The empirical results confirm that learning-by-doing and spillover effects are prevalent, and their effects are stronger at the beginning and weaker at the end of the product life cycle.
    • Á¦Ç°»ý¸íÁֱ⿡ µû¸¥ ½ÃÀåÁö¹è·ÂÀÇ µ¿ÅÂÀû º¯È­°úÁ¤¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¿¬±¸: DRAM »ê¾÷À» Áß½ÉÀ¸·Î
      ±èµ¿ÈÆ, Osamu Yoshioka


         ³í¹®Àº Á¦Ç°»ý¸í Áֱ⿡ µû¸¥ ½ÃÀåÁö¹è·ÂÀÇ º¯È­°úÁ¤À» °íÂûÇϱâ À§ÇÏ¿© µ¿ÅÂÀû °úÁ¡¸ðÇüÀ» ¼³Á¤ÇÏ°í 1¸Þ°¡ DRAMÀ» Áß½ÉÀ¸·Î ½ÇÁõºÐ¼® ÇÏ¿´´Ù. ÇÑ°èºñ¿ë ¼³Á¤¿¡ À־ ±Ô¸ðÀÇ °æÁ¦, °æÇè¿¡ ÀÇÇÑ ÇнÀ(learning-by-doing), ±â¼úÈ®»ê(spillover)È¿°ú¸¦ °í·ÁÇÏ¿´À¸¸ç À̵éÀÌ Á¦Ç° »ý¸íÁֱ⿡ µû¶ó ¾î¶»°Ô º¯È­ÇÏ´ÂÁö ºÐ¼®ÇÏ¿´´Ù. 1¸Þ°¡ DRAM»ê¾÷ÀÇ °æ¿ì ½ÃÀåÁö¹è·ÂÀº Á¦Ç°»ý¸íÁֱ⸦ µû¶ó º¯È­ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀÌ Áõ¸íÀÌ µÇ¾úÀ¸¸ç »ý¸íÁÖ±â Ãʹݿ¡ ³ô°í Áß°£¿¡ »ç¶óÁ³´Ù°¡ »ý¸íÁÖ±â ÈĹݿ¡ ¼ÒÆøÀ¸·Î Áõ°¡ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ¸·Î ³ªÅ¸³ª°í ÀÖ´Ù. °æÇè¿¡ ÀÇÇÑ ÇнÀÈ¿°ú³ª ±â¼úÈ®»ê È¿°ú´Â Á¦Ç°»ý¸íÁÖ±â Àü¹Ý¿¡ °­ÇÏ°Ô ³ªÅ¸³ª°í ÀÖÀ¸¸ç ÈĹݿ¡´Â ¾àÇØÁö´Â °ÍÀ¸·Î ÃßÁ¤ÀÌ µÇ¾ú´Ù.
    ÇÏÀÌ¿¡Å©ÀÇ ÀÚ»ýÀû Áú¼­¿Í ÇùÁ¶Àû ÇàÀ§±ÔÄ¢
    Á¶ÇʱÔ
    Pages 187-212
  • Abstract ( Eng | Kor ) || PDF
    • Hayek's Spontaneous Order and Cooperative Behavior Rule
      Pil Kyoo Jo


         Hayek's theory of cultural evolution should demonstrate that spontaneous social order is the result of the individual selection and the market order can satisfy the condition under which cooperative behavior rules can be selected. However, for the fact that the market transactions are usually carried out by a lot of anonymous persons, the condition is difficult to be satisfied in market order. But it dose not mean that market order cannot but be inefficient. There may be particular conditions under which the cooperative agents can survive, and it suggests that institution design be necessary for the conditions under which the market transaction can result in benefit order. Market is embedded among many other social institutions, and market order is not spontaneous in itself, but should be understood in the process of interaction with the surrounding social institutions.
    •    ÇÏÀÌ¿¡Å©ÀÇ ¹®È­ÁøÈ­·ÐÀÌ ÀÌ·ÐÀû Á¤ÇÕ¼ºÀ» È®º¸Çϱâ À§Çؼ­´Â ÀÚ»ýÀû Áú¼­°¡ °³Ã¼¼±º°ÀÇ °á°úÀ̸鼭 µ¿½Ã¿¡ ½ÃÀåÁú¼­ÇÏ¿¡¼­ ÇùÁ¶Àû ÇàÀ§±ÔÄ¢ÀÌ ¼±º°µÉ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â Á¶°ÇÀÌ ÃæÁ·µÉ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» ³íÁõÇؾ߸¸ ÇÑ´Ù. ±×·¯³ª ½ÃÀå°Å·¡°¡ À͸íÀû ´Ù¼ö¿¡ ÀÇÇؼ­ °Å·¡µÈ´Ù´Â Ư¼ºÀ» °í·ÁÇÒ ¶§ ÀÚ»ýÀû ½ÃÀå°úÁ¤ ¼Ó¿¡¼­ ÇùÁ¶Àû ÇàÀ§±ÔÄ¢ÀÌ ¼±º°µÉ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â Á¶°ÇÀÌ ÃæÁ·µÇ±â ¾î·Æ´Ù. ±×·¸´Ù°í ÀÌ°ÍÀÌ ½ÃÀåÁú¼­°¡ ¹Ýµå½Ã ºñÈ¿À²ÀûÀÏ ¼ö¹Û¿¡ ¾ø´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» ÀǹÌÇÏÁö´Â ¾Ê´Â´Ù. »çȸÀÇ Æ¯Á¤ Á¦µµÀû Á¶°ÇÇÏ¿¡¼­ ÇùÁ¶Àû ÇàÀ§±ÔÄ¢Àº »ýÁ¸ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ°í, ÀÌ´Â ½ÃÀå°Å·¡°¡ È¿À²Àû °á°ú¸¦ ³º±â À§Çؼ­´Â ÇùÁ¶Àû ÇàÀ§±ÔÄ¢ÀÇ ¼±º° Á¶°ÇÀ¸·Î¼­ÀÇ ÀûÀýÇÑ Á¦µµ¼³°è°¡ ÇÊ¿äÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» ÀǹÌÇÑ´Ù. ½ÃÀå ¿ª½Ã ¿©·¯ Á¦µµµé °¡¿îµ¥ ÇϳªÀ̸ç, ½ÃÀåÁú¼­´Â ±× ÀÚü·Î ÀÚ»ýÀûÀ̱⺸´Ù´Â ½ÃÀåÀ» µÑ·¯½Ñ ´Ù¸¥ Á¦µµµé°úÀÇ »óÈ£ÀÛ¿ë °úÁ¤ ¼Ó¿¡¼­ ÀÌÇصǾî¾ß ÇÑ´Ù.
    ±â¾÷ÀÇ ÃÖÀûÀÚº»±¸Á¶¿Í ±¹°¡ÀÇ ÀûÁ¤Ã¤¹«ºñÀ²
    Á¶¼º¿ø
    Pages 213-246
  • Abstract ( Eng | Kor ) || PDF
    • Firm's Optimal Capital Structure and the Optimal Government Debt Ratio
      Sungwon Cho


         This paper estimates the optimal government debt ratio of Korea using an economic model based on an optimal capital structure theory in corporate finance literature. Empirical results indicate that there exists a nonlinear inverse relationship between the government debt ratio and social welfare, which implies that optimal government debt ratio could exist. Estimation result using the time-series data of government debt in Korea resulted in an optimal government debt ratio of 21%, which means that social welfare in Korea is maximized at this specific debt ratio.
    •    º» ¿¬±¸¿¡¼­´Â ±â¾÷ÀÇ ÃÖÀûÀÚº»±¸Á¶ÀÌ·ÐÀ» ±¹°¡Ã¤¹« ¹®Á¦¿¡ Àû¿ëÇÏ¿© »çȸÈÄ»ýÀÌ ±Ø´ëÈ­µÇ´Â ¿ì¸®³ª¶óÀÇ ÀûÁ¤ ±¹°¡Ã¤¹«ºñÀ²À» ÃßÁ¤ÇÏ¿´´Ù. º» ¿¬±¸ÀÇ ÁÖ¿ä ºÐ¼®°á°ú´Â ´ÙÀ½°ú °°´Ù. ù°, ¿ì¸®³ª¶óÀÇ °æ¿ì, ±¹°¡Ã¤¹«ºñÀ²°ú »çȸÈÄ»ý °£¿¡ ¿ª UÀÚ ÇüÅÂÀÇ ºñ¼±Çü°ü°è°¡ ¼º¸³ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ¸·Î ºÐ¼®µÇ¾î »çȸÈÄ»ýÀÌ ±Ø´ëÈ­µÇ´Â ÀûÁ¤ ±¹°¡Ã¤¹«ºñÀ²ÀÌ Á¸ÀçÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖÀ½À» º¸¿©ÁÖ¾ú´Ù. µÑ°, ±¹°¡Ã¤¹« ½Ã°è¿­ ÀڷḦ È°¿ëÇÏ¿© ÀûÁ¤Ã¤¹«ºñÀ²À» ÃßÁ¤ÇÑ °á°ú, ¿ì¸®³ª¶óÀÇ ÀûÁ¤ ±¹°¡Ã¤¹«ºñÀ²Àº 21%·Î »êÁ¤µÇ¾ú´Ù. ÀÌ´Â GDP ´ëºñ ±¹°¡Ã¤¹«ºñÀ²ÀÌ 21%ÀÏ ¶§, ¿ì¸®³ª¶óÀÇ »çȸÈÄ»ýÀÌ ±Ø´ëÈ­µÈ´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» ÀǹÌÇϸç, ±¹°¡Ã¤¹«ÀÇ ÁßÀå±â ¸ñÇ¥¼öÁØÀ» ÀÌ¿Í °°Àº ÀûÁ¤ºñÀ²¿¡ ¸ÂÃç ±¹°¡Ã¤¹«¸¦ °ü¸®ÇØ ³ª°¥ ÇÊ¿ä°¡ ÀÖÀ½À» ½Ã»çÇÑ´Ù.


The Korean Journal of Economics, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Autumn 2013)