Çѱ¹°æÁ¦Çк¸ Á¦ 26±Ç, Á¦ 1È£ (2019³â º½)

    The Evolution of FTA Network: Empirics and Theory
    Kichun Kang, Yong-Ju Lee
    Pages 3-33
  • Abstract ( Eng | Kor ) || PDF
    • The Evolution of FTA Network: Empirics and Theory
      Kichun Kang, Yong-Ju Lee


         This study examines the historic evolution of FTA network during the period from 1973 to the mid-2010s. We first observe important empirical features that have appeared in FTA network evolution over time and, then, show that these features match with micro-incentives of participating individual countries. Finally, by incorporating empirical observations and micro-incentives of countries into the macro-evolution model, we explain how the FTA network evolves over time. The macro-evolution model based on empirical observations and micro-incentives well explains the evolution of FTA network, especially until the early 2000s. This fact implies that even random formation process of network produces a good approximation to the observed network as long as important features are well incorporated into the network formation process. Additionally, we observe that although the proliferation of regionalism may not lead to complete global trade liberalization, it makes substantial contribution to the establishment of global village.
    •    º» ³í¹®Àº 1973³âºÎÅÍ 2010³â´ë Á߹ݱîÁöÀÇ ±â°£ µ¿¾È ÀϾ FTA ³×Æ® ¿öÅ©ÀÇ ¿ª»çÀû ÁøÈ­ °úÁ¤À» »ìÆ캻´Ù. ¸ÕÀú, ÀÌ ±â°£ µ¿¾È FTA ³×Æ®¿öÅ© ÁøÈ­¿¡¼­ ³ªÅ¸³­ Áß¿äÇÑ ½ÇÁõÀû Ư¼ºÀ» °üÂûÇÏ°í, ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ Æ¯¼ºµéÀÌ Âü¿©ÀÚµéÀÇ ¹Ì½ÃÀû Àμ¾Æ¼ºê¿Í ºÎÇÕÇÔÀ» ¼³¸íÇÑ´Ù. ±×¸®°í ½ÇÁõÀû Ư¼º°ú ¹Ì½ÃÀû Àμ¾Æ¼ºê¸¦ ¹Ý¿µÇÑ ·£´ý °Å½ÃÁøÈ­¸ðÇüÀÌ ½ÇÁ¦ FTA ³×Æ®¿öÅ©ÀÇ ÁøÈ­¸¦ ¾î´À Á¤µµ ¼³¸íÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖÀ½À» º¸ÀδÙ. ƯÈ÷ ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ´Ü¼ø °Å½ÃÁøÈ­¸ðÇüÀÌ 2000³â´ë ÃʹݱîÁö´Â FTA ³×Æ®¿öÅ©ÀÇ ÁøÈ­¸¦ Àß ¼³¸íÇÔÀ» º¸ÀδÙ. ¶ÇÇÑ, ºñ·Ï Áö¿ªÁÖÀÇ ¹«¿ªÇùÁ¤ÀÇ È®»êÀÌ ¿ÏÀüÇÑ ±Û·Î¹ú ¹«¿ªÀÚÀ¯È­¿¡ À̸£°Ô ÇÏÁö´Â ¸øÇÏÁö¸¸, Áö±¸ÃÌÀÇ Çü¼º¿¡ »ó´çÇÑ ±â¿©°¡ ÀÖÀ½À» ½Ã»çÁ¡À¸·Î µµÃâÇÑ´Ù.
    Endogenous Sanctions, Foreign Investment, and Democratization
    Kyung Woong Koh
    Pages 35-62
  • Abstract ( Eng | Kor ) || PDF
    • Endogenous Sanctions, Foreign Investment, and Democratization
      Kyung Woong Koh


         This paper establishes a sequential game-theoretical model of a dictatorship with two political arenas: an international politics of sanctions or foreign investment into the dictatorship¡¯s capital markets, and domestic politics of democratization between the Dictator and the Poor. In line with existing theory and empirics, the Dictator may open a dictatorship¡¯s capital markets to lower the redistributive pressures by the disenfranchised poor. Sanctions are more likely to occur as world interest rates rise.
    •    º» ³í¹®Àº ³»»ýÀû ±ÝÀ¶ÅëÇÕÀ» °í·ÁÇÏ´Â µ¶ÀçÁÖÀÇ ±¹°¡¸¦ ´Ü°èÀû °ÔÀÓÀÌ·Ð ¸ðÇüÀ¸·Î Ç¥ÇöÇÑ´Ù. µ¶ÀçÁÖÀÇ ±¹°¡´Â °­´ë±¹°úÀÇ Á¦Àç¿Í ÇØ¿ÜÀÚº»ÅõÀÚ À¯Ä¡ ¸¦ Á¤ÇÏ´Â ±¹Á¦Àû Á¤Ä¡¿Í ºó°ïÃþ°úÀÇ ¹ÎÁÖÈ­¸¦ Á¤ÇÏ´Â ±¹³»Àû Á¤Ä¡°ÔÀÓÀ» °Å Ä£´Ù. µ¶ÀçÀÚÀº ÀçºÐ¹è ¿ä±¸¸¦ ¾ïÁ¦Çϱâ À§ÇØ ÀÚº»½ÃÀåÀ» °³¹æÇϸç, ÀÌ °á°ú ´Â ±âÁ¸ À̷аú ½ÇÁõÀû ¿¬±¸¿Í °°Àº °á°ú¸¦ µµÃâÇÑ´Ù. ¼¼°èÀÌÀÚÀ²ÀÌ ³ô¾ÆÁú¼ö ·Ï °­´ë±¹ÀÌ ±ÝÀ¶½ÃÀåÀ» Á¦ÀçÇÒ °¡´É¼ºÀÌ ³ô¾ÆÁø´Ù.
    ÁÖÅñÝÀ¶Á¤Ã¥ÀÇ °Å½Ã °æÁ¦Àû È¿°ú: ÀϹݱÕÇü¸ðÇü ºÐ¼®À» Áß½ÉÀ¸·Î
    ±èÁö¼·
    Pages 63-104
  • Abstract ( Eng | Kor ) || PDF
    • Macroeconomic Effects of Housing Finance Policies: General Equilibrium Analysis
      Jiseob Kim


         This paper quantitatively examines how household debt and housing finance policies impact household-finance moments, house prices, and household welfare. I consider two policy changes: the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and the refinance policies. First, when the LTV policy is relaxed, the house price, the rent price, and the household debt simultaneously increase. As the price of the housing service increases, household welfare declines. However, more than half of population supports such policy changes. Second, when households cannot easily refinance the mortgage, the house price, the rent price, and the household debt simultaneously decline. Though the decrease in housing service costs increases aggregate household welfare, less than half of population supports such policy changes.
    •    º» ³í¹®Àº °¡°èºÎä °ü·Ã Á¤Ã¥ ¹× ÁÖÅñÝÀ¶ ȯ°æÀÇ º¯È­°¡ ÁÖ¿ä °¡°è±ÝÀ¶ ÁöÇ¥, ÁÖÅð¡°Ý, °¡°èÈÄ»ý µî¿¡ ¹ÌÄ¡´Â È¿°ú¸¦ µ¿ÅÂÀû È®·ü±ÕÇü¸ðÇüÀ» ÅëÇØ ºÐ¼®ÇÑ´Ù. µÎ °¡Áö Á¤Ã¥ ȯ°æ º¯È­¸¦ °í·ÁÇÑ´Ù. ù°, LTV(Loan-tovalue) ºñÀ² »óÇÑ ±ÔÁ¦¸¦ ¿ÏÈ­ÇÒ °æ¿ì, ÁÖÅð¡°Ý ¹× ÁÖÅÃÀÓ´ë·á´Â »ó½ÂÇÏ °í °¡°èºÎä´Â Áõ°¡ÇÑ´Ù. Áְźñ¿ëÀÇ »ó½ÂÀ¸·Î ÀÎÇØ °æÁ¦ Àü¹ÝÀÇ ÈÄ»ýÀº °¨¼ÒÇÏÁö¸¸, LTV ºñÀ² ±ÔÁ¦¿ÏÈ­¸¦ ÁöÁöÇÏ´Â °¡±¸°¡ Àüü °¡±¸ÀÇ Àý¹Ý ÀÌ »óÀ» Â÷ÁöÇÑ´Ù. µÑ°, Â÷ȯ ¹× ½Å±Ô ´ëÃâÀÌ Á¦ÇÑµÉ °æ¿ì, ÁÖÅüö¿äÀÇ °¨¼Ò ¿Í ÇÔ²² ÁÖÅð¡°Ý ¹× ÁÖÅÃÀÓ´ë·á°¡ Ç϶ôÇÏ°í °¡°èºÎä´Â °¨¼ÒÇÑ´Ù. Áְźñ ¿ëÀÇ °¨¼Ò´Â °æÁ¦ Àü¹ÝÀÇ ÈÄ»ýÀ» Áõ°¡½ÃÅ°Áö¸¸, ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ °Å½Ã±ÝÀ¶È¯°æÀÇ º¯ È­¸¦ ÁöÁöÇÏ´Â °¡±¸´Â Àüü °¡±¸ÀÇ Àý¹Ý ÀÌÇÏ´Ù.
    Adversarial Bias and Court-Appointed Experts in Litigation
    Chulyoung Kim, Chansik Yoon
    Pages 105-131
  • Abstract ( Eng | Kor ) || PDF
    • Adversarial Bias and Court-Appointed Experts in Litigation
      Chulyoung Kim, Chansik Yoon


         Adversarial bias is witness bias that arises because litigants retain experts to advance their causes. We provide a simple framework where the level of adversarial bias is endogenously determined in a litigation process. Using this model, we study the effect of using a court-appointed expert on the level of adversarial bias and the average error rates, and find an interesting trade-off: although the judge can reduce the number of mistakes at trial by consulting a court-appointed expert, litigants choose to hire biased experts more frequently in response, which increases the level of adversarial bias, thereby inducing evidence distortion more often.
    •    Àû´ë ÆíÇâÀ̶õ ¼Ò¼Û ´ç»çÀÚµéÀÌ ÀÚ½ÅÀÇ ¼Ò¼ÛÀ» ÁøÇà½ÃÅ°±â À§ÇÑ Àü¹®°¡¸¦ º¸À¯ÇÔÀ¸·Î½á ¹ß»ýÇÏ´Â Áõ¾ð¿¡¼­ÀÇ ÆíÇâÀ» ¸»ÇÑ´Ù. ¿ì¸®´Â ±×·¯ÇÑ Àû´ë ÆíÇâ ÀÇ Á¤µµ°¡ ¼Ò¼Û °úÁ¤¿¡¼­ ³»»ýÀûÀ¸·Î °áÁ¤µÇ´Â °£´ÜÇÑ ºÐ¼®Æ²À» Á¦°øÇÑ´Ù. º» ¸ðÇüÀ» ÅëÇØ, ¿ì¸®´Â ±¹¼± Àü¹®°¡¸¦ »ç¿ëÇÏ´Â °ÍÀÌ Àû´ë ÆíÇâÀÇ Á¤µµ ¹× Æò±Õ ÀûÀÎ ¿À·ùÀ²¿¡ ¹ÌÄ¡´Â ¿µÇâÀ» ºÐ¼®ÇÏ°í, Èï¹Ì·Î¿î Æ®·¹À̵å¿ÀÇÁ °ü°è¸¦ ¹ß°ß ÇÑ´Ù: ±¹¼± Àü¹®°¡¿¡°Ô ÀÚ¹®À» ±¸ÇÔÀ¸·Î½á ÆÇ»ç´Â ÀçÆÇ¿¡¼­ÀÇ ½Ç¼öÀÇ ¼ö¸¦ ÁÙÀÏ ¼ö´Â ÀÖÁö¸¸, ¼Ò¼Û ´ç»çÀÚµéÀº ±×¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¹ÝÀÀÀ¸·Î¼­ ÆíÇâµÈ Àü¹®°¡¸¦ ´õ¿í ºó¹øÇÏ°Ô °í¿ëÇϱ⸦ ¼±ÅÃÇϸç, ÀÌ°ÍÀº Àû´ë ÆíÇâÀÇ Á¤µµ¸¦ Áõ°¡½ÃÅ°°í, µû¶ó¼­ Áõ°Å ¿Ö°îÀ» ´õ¿í ºó¹øÈ÷ ¹ß»ý½ÃŲ´Ù.
    Ç°¸ñº° ±³¿ª·®¿¡ ¿µÇâÀ» ¹ÌÄ¡´Â °Å½Ã°æÁ¦ º¯µ¿¼º ¿äÀÎ ºÐ¼® - Çѱ¹ÀÇ ÁÖ¿ä ±³¿ª Ç°¸ñÀ» Áß½ÉÀ¸·Î
    ±èµµ¿¬
    Pages 133-152
  • Abstract ( Eng | Kor ) || PDF
    • Which Macroeconomic Volatility Factors affect the Volume of Main Trade Goods?: Evidence from Korea
      Doyeon Kim


         Korea¡¯s exports have become more concentrated on a small number of products, which brings a concern about the lack of trade diversity. We need to scrutinize the trade volatility of major traded goods if it is not easy to make a solution about trade concentration. We examine the risk factors which affect the volatility of major traded goods of Korea. According to our empirical analysis, the trade volume of major exported goods such as semiconductor is affected by the volatility of foreign exchange rate, while the volume of major imported goods such as crude oil and oil products is affected by the volatility of oil price.
    •    ÃÖ±Ù Çѱ¹ÀÇ ´ë¿Ü ¼öÃâÀÌ ¼Ò¼öÀÇ Ç°¸ñ¿¡ ÁýÁߵǸ鼭 ±³¿ª ´Ù¾ç¼ºÀÌ ÀúÇØµÇ °í ÀÖ´Ù. ÀÌ¿Í °°Àº »óȲ¿¡¼­ ±³¿ª Á¦Ç°ÀÇ ´Ù¾ç¼ºÀÌ °³¼±µÇ±â ¾î·Æ´Ù¸é ÁÖ ¿ä ±³¿ª Ç°¸ñÀÇ ±³¿ª º¯µ¿¼ºÀ» ÁÖ½ÃÇØ¾ß ÇÒ ÇÊ¿ä°¡ ÀÖ´Ù. º» ¿¬±¸¿¡¼­´Â Çѱ¹ÀÇ ÁÖ¿ä ±³¿ª Ç°¸ñ¿¡ ´ëÇØ ¾î¶² Á¾·ùÀÇ À§Çè¿¡ ÀÇÇØ ±³¿ª·®ÀÌ À¯ÀÇÇÏ °Ô º¯µ¿ÇÏ´ÂÁö »ìÆ캻´Ù. ½ÇÁõºÐ¼® °á°ú¸¦ Á¾ÇÕÇغ¸¸é Çѱ¹ÀÇ ±³¿ª¿¡¼­ ¹Ý µµÃ¼¸¦ ºñ·ÔÇÑ ÁÖ¿ä ¼öÃâ¿¡ ´ëÇؼ­´Â ȯÀ² º¯µ¿¼ºÀÌ À¯ÀÇÇÑ ¿µÇâÀ» ¹ÌÄ¡°í ÀÖ¾úÀ¸¸ç, ¿øÀ¯¿Í ¼®À¯Á¦Ç°À» ºñ·ÔÇÑ ÁÖ¿ä ¼öÀÔ¿¡ ´ëÇؼ­´Â À¯°¡ º¯µ¿¼ºÀÌ À¯ÀÇÇÑ ¿µÇâÀ» ¹ÌÄ¡°í ÀÖÀ½ÀÌ ³ªÅ¸³µ´Ù.


The Korean Journal of Economics, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Spring 2019)